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Abstract
In this paper, we take a fresh look at three Popperian concepts:
riskiness, falsifiability, and truthlikeness (or verisimilitude) of scien-
tific hypotheses or theories. First, we make explicit the dimensions
that underlie the notion of riskiness. Secondly, we examine if and how
degrees of falsifiability can be defined, and how they are related to var-
ious dimensions of the concept of riskiness as well as the experimental
context. Thirdly, we consider the relation of riskiness to (expected
degrees of) truthlikeness. Throughout, we pay special attention to
probabilistic theories and we offer a tentative, quantitative account of
verisimilitude for probabilistic theories.
“Modern logic, as I hope is now
evident, has the effect of
enlarging our abstract
imagination, and providing an
infinite number of possible
hypotheses to be applied in the
analysis of any complex fact.”
– Russell (1914, p. 58).
A theory is falsifiable if it allows us to deduce predictions that can be
compared to evidence, which according to our background knowledge could
show the prediction — and hence the theory — to be false. In his defense of
falsifiability as a demarcation criterion, Popper has stressed the importance
of bold, risky claims that can be tested, for they allow science to make
progress. Moreover, in his work on verisimilitude, Popper emphasized that
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outright false theories can nevertheless be helpful on our way towards better
theories. In this article, we try to analyze the relevant notion of riskiness,
and take a fresh look at both falsifiability and verisimilitude of probabilistic
theories. Our approach is inspired by the Bayesian literature as well as recent
proposals for quantitative measures of verisimilitude and approximate truth
(as reviewed in Section 3.1).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1, we set the scene by
discussing an example due to Jefferys (1990). In Section 2, we make explicit
the dimensions that underlie the notion of riskiness. We also examine if
and how degrees of falsifiability can be defined, and how they are related to
various dimensions of the concept of riskiness as well as the experimental
context. Furthermore, we consider a crucial difference between determin-
istic and indeterministic theories in terms of their degrees of falsifiability.
In Section 3, we review consequence-based approaches to quantifying truth-
likeness and, in Section 4, we propose alternative definitions of (expected
degrees of) truthlikeness and approximate truth that are better suited for
probabilistic theories. We summarize our findings in Section 5.
1 Three pundits, one true probability distribution
To illustrate the themes we want to explore here, we discuss an informal
example given by Jefferys (1990) (in which we changed one of the numbers):
A priori, our “surprise” when we observe a value close to a sharp
prediction is much greater than it would be if the theory made
only a vague prediction. For example, consider a wholly imagi-
nary world where stock market pundits provide standard devia-
tions along with their predictions of market indexes. Suppose a
pundit makes a prediction of the value of an index a year hence,
and quotes a standard deviation of [2]% for his prediction. We
would probably be quite surprised if the actual value turned out
to be within several percent of the prediction, and if this hap-
pened we might want to investigate the pundit more closely. By
making a precise prediction, this pundit takes a great risk of be-
ing proven wrong (and losing our business). By the same token,
when his prediction turns out even approximately correct, we are
surprised, and the likelihood that we will follow his advice in the
future may be increased. We would probably be less interested
in a second pundit, who predicted the same value for the index
as did the first, but who quoted a standard deviation of 20%. We
would doubtless have little interest at all in a third pundit who
informed us only that “the market will fluctuate,” even though
that prediction is virtually certain to be fulfilled!
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We could reconstruct this scenario in terms of a unique, true value of the
index at the specified time. However, since we want to address probabilistic
theories (which make empirically verifiable, statistical hypotheses about the
world), we assume a true probability function instead. This may either be an
objective chance function or an epistemic probability assessment that is well-
calibrated (say, from a group of experts), both of which can be modeled in a
Bayesian context. Also the subjective probabilities expressed by the pundits
can be represented as such. Throughout this paper we will apply Bayesian
ideas, so considering the evidence will typically lead to a revision of prior
probabilities (assigned to theories or associated hypotheses) to posteriors,
which can be computed via Bayes’ theorem.
One modeling choice could be to use Gaussian distributions and to choose
the parameters such that the first prediction is strongly disconfirmed by the
evidence. However, the results are even more striking when we opt for nor-
malized boxcar functions (i.e., uniform distributions truncated on an inter-
val), which allow for outright falsification of these probabilistic predictions.
So, let’s assume both hypotheses of the first two pundits are normalized
uniform distributions on intervals centred on the same value, µ. The first
distribution is nonzero on an interval that is ten times narrower than the
second. Now assume that the interval where the true distribution takes on
nonzero values and that includes the realized value turns out to fall in the
second range and not in the first, but very close to the latter, as depicted in
Fig. 1. In this case, outright falsification of the first hypothesis occurs and
the posterior probability of the second is unity (independently of the priors,
as long as they start out as non-zero). Still, we could be surprised by how
close the first pundit’s guess was and feel motivated to investigate it further,
exactly as Jefferys (1990) described.
While the posterior for the first pundit’s hypothesis is zero, it was much
bolder than the second’s and it was only a near miss. This may warrant
looking into its neighborhood, rather than going on with the less precise,
second hypothesis. If we only consider the posteriors, however, our surprise
at finding a value relatively close to the precise, first prediction seems irra-
tional, or at least: on their own, posteriors do not offer any justification for
Jefferys’s move to inspect the precise, near-miss hypothesis closer.
This observation is related to another aspect that posteriors do not track:
which of the competing hypotheses is more truthlike. The fact that the true
hypothesis is twenty times as narrow as the second hypothesis and only half
as narrow as the first or that the centre of the peak of the true hypothesis is
close to that of both alternatives is not taken into account by posteriors at
all. Doing this in general requires a method for measuring the similarity of
the shape and position of hypothetical distributions compared to the true
one.
Finally, consider the third pundit’s prediction that “the market will fluc-
tuate”: this hypothesis is outright falsifiable (it is in principle possible that
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Figure 1: Numerical example of normalized boxcar predictions by two pun-
dits, one more precise than the other, as well as the true distribution. The
area under each of the curves is unity (due to normalization of probability
distributions).
the market will turn out not to fluctuate and if this possibility is realized,
this is observable), yet it is so extremely likely (on nearly any prior) that the
market will fluctuate that this claim is not risky at all. Moreover, the predic-
tion of the third pundit has a very different structure than the former two,
which could be reconstructed as given by a single probability distribution (or
perhaps a narrow family thereof). Instead, the third prediction excludes one
possible realization (a constant path of the index through time), allowing
all others, without assigning any probabilities to them at all. As such, this
prediction is compatible with an infinite family of probability distributions.
The negation of the third prediction corresponds to a singleton in the space
of all possible paths for the index: “the market will not fluctuate” is equally
falsifiable, but extremely risky, its prior being zero or at least extremely
close to it (on nearly any probability distribution).
So, while the first two are in some sense very precise predictions, neither
would be outright falsifiable or verifiable if we had chosen to reconstruct
them as Gaussians (which would certainly be a defendable choice). But
the third pundit’s prediction, which is a very general claim that strongly
underdescribes the probabilities, is both falsifiable and verifiable.
To conclude this section, the example we borrowed from Jefferys (1990)
suggests that Popper was right in emphasizing the relation between riskiness
and falsifiability. Moreover, especially if we consider a Gaussian reconstruc-
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tion, it seems to suggest that there are degrees of falsifiability, according to
which the first pundit’s claim would be falsifiable to a higher degree than
the second’s. The third pundit’s claim, however, shows it is possible for a
prediction to be outright falsifiable yet not risky at all.
2 Riskiness and falsifiability
Popper (1959) identified falsifiability as a demarcation criterion for scientific
theories. On his account, theories that make riskier predictions are assumed
to be more easily falsifiable than others. Popper’s idea of falsifiability was
inspired by an asymmetry from mathematics: if a conjecture is false, it can
be falsified by providing a single counterexample, whereas, if the conjecture
is true, finding a proof tends to require more work. In the empirical sciences,
proving a universal hypothesis (if it is indeed true) requires verifying all in-
stances, which is impossible if the domain is infinite, whereas falsification (if
the universal hypothesis is false) seems to require only a single counterexam-
ple, just like in mathematics. In practice, even for deterministic hypotheses,
the picture is more complicated, due to measurement error and the Duhem–
Quine problem. Moreover, for probabilistic hypotheses, falsification seems
to be unobtainable (but see Section 2.2).
In any case, Popper’s falsifiability, proposed as a demarcation criterion
on hypotheses (or theories), is a condition on the form of the statements. Sci-
entific hypotheses should be formulated such that empirically testable pre-
dictions can be derived from them and if the hypothesis is false, it should be
possible to make an observation showing as much. This requires hypotheses
to be formulated in an explicit and clear way, geared toward observational
consequences. Although Popper’s falsifiability was a categorical notion (ei-
ther it applies to a hypothesis or it does not), not all falsifiable hypotheses
are created equal: Popper preferred those that made riskier predictions.
Our first task in this section is to disentangle the various dimensions of
riskiness and to track their relation to falsifiability. We also aim to formulate
clear desiderata for a formal account of degrees of falsifiability, albeit without
fleshing out a full proposal that achieves them.
2.1 Two dimensions of riskiness
In the context of his falsificationism, Popper (1959) preferred bold or risky
predictions: those that were rich in content, that were unlikely according
to competing, widely accepted theories or that predicted entirely new phe-
nomena.
On our analysis, this Popperian concept of riskiness (or boldness) con-
sists of at least two aspects. Teasing these apart is essential for getting a
good grip on the interplay between riskiness and falsifiability — as well as
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between riskiness and verisimilitude (to which we turn in Section 3). Accord-
ing to our analysis, the two main ingredients of riskiness are the following.
(1) Informativeness For example, a hypothesis that gives a point predic-
tion or a small range of possible measurement outcomes is more in-
formative than one that gives a wide interval of possible values. That
makes the former more risky. Of course, an informative prediction,
which is rich in content and precise, may be wide off the mark; in
other words, it may be very inaccurate, but that is precisely the point:
the more informative a prediction is, the more opportunities it al-
lows to detect discrepancies with the facts if it is false. Moreover, a
substantive and precise prediction can be viewed as a conjunction of
less substantive and precise hypotheses, so its prior cannot be higher
than those of the latter: this is precisely what makes an informative
prediction risky.
(2) Conceptual novelty A hypothesis may predict phenomena that have
no counterpart in any previous theory and that may not have been
observed yet. This aspect is related to discussions in philosophy of
science concerning radically new theories, language change, etc. (see,
e.g., Masterton et al., 2017 and Steele & Stefansson, 2020). Compared
to the previous two aspects of riskiness, this one is more difficult to
represent formally. For probabilistic theories, this issue is related to
changes to the sample space, or at least the partition thereof, and it
creates additional issues for how to set the priors (see, e.g., Wenmack-
ers & Romeijn, 2016).
While the notion of conceptual novelty is interesting in its own right,
there is still plenty of formal work to do on the first dimension, informative-
ness, which will be our focus here. Informativeness is language-dependent:
the granularity of the language depends on what can be expressed. Of the
three pundits in Section 1, the first one scored the highest and the third one
the lowest on this dimension. See Appendix A for a formal development of
this idea.
Informativeness does not equal improbability. To disentangle these con-
cepts, we add a dimension of improbability that is not a dimension of Pop-
perian riskiness:
Low probability despite equal informativeness Although probabilities
are constrained by a partial ordering tracking informativeness, the lat-
ter is not sufficient to settle the numerical prior probability values in a
unique way. Hence, subjective Bayesianism allows for individual vari-
ation across probability assignments by rational agents. These varia-
tions may be due to differences in the prior, differences in past learning
or a combination thereof. As a result, when we compare hypotheses
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that are equally rich in content and equally precise, they may still have
unequal probabilities prior to testing according to a particular ratio-
nal agent (e.g., a scientist). Advancing a hypothesis with a lower prior
may be regarded as a more “risky” choice, but in this case, it seems
irrational to pursue it. However, if we tease apart the two reasons why
a hypothesis may have a low prior — i.e., due to high informativeness
and subjective variation across equally informative hypotheses — it
becomes clear that only the former source of improbability is fruitful
for advancing science.
2.2 Experimental context
From Section 2.1 we retain informativeness as an important gradable vari-
able associated with riskiness, which makes it a promising ingredient of an
analysis of falsifiability as a gradable notion. However, informativeness does
not depend on the experimental context, which we analyze here.
It has become commonplace in philosophy of science and (Bayesian) epis-
temology to claim that probabilistic theories can only be disconfirmed to an
arbitrarily high degree, but that they can never be outright falsified. After
all, the argument goes, no finite length of observations of heads falsifies the
hypothesis that the coin is fair. This example supposedly shows that there
are hypotheses that are unfalsifiable, but highly disconfirmable. However,
falsification is not unobtainable for all probabilistic hypotheses in all circum-
stances. In fact, we have already encountered an example of the possible
falsification of a probabilistic hypothesis in Section 1: assuming market in-
dexes can only take on a finite number of discrete values, a distribution that
is zero except for a narrow interval (such as the first pundit’s curve in Fig. 1)
is outright falsified by any observation outside of that interval.
The next two examples illustrate in yet another way why we need to
fix a reference class of experiments explicitly. They both show that even
probabilistic hypotheses that do not rule out any part of the sample space
in advance may still be falsifiable, given sufficient experimental resources.
Example 1. (Emptying the bag) Suppose one has an opaque bag with three
marbles inside: either two black marbles and one white marble or vice versa.
The only experiment allowed to gauge the color of the marbles in the bag is
taking one marble out of the bag and placing it back before another draw
can be made. We might have some prior credences with regard to drawing a
black marble: this constitutes a probabilistic theory.
Without the restriction to draw one marble at a time, however, there is
a very simple way to find out the truth: empty the bag and see what is in it.
Example 2. (Superexperiments) Consider a demigod who can do a certain
experiment an infinite number of times in a finite time frame: we call this a
“superexperiment” — an idea analogous to supertasks and hypercomputation.
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Some theories would remain falsifiable, while others become falsifiable in
this context. Yet, a statement like “all ravens are black” does not become
verifiable; the demigod can only test all ravens that exist at the time of the
experiment, for instance.
Now, consider a jar containing a countable infinity of numbered marbles.
We know that all marbles are marked by a unique natural number; we do not
know, however, whether each natural number is printed on a marble. For
instance, it could be the case that the jar only contains marbles with even
numbers printed on them. Consider the statement h: “all numbers except
for one unknown number, n, are printed on a marble in the jar.” This
hypothesis is not falsifiable by usual methods but it is falsifiable by means of
a superexperiment. Indeed, it is possible for the demigod to pick all naturals,
thereby falsifying h.
The first example may strike the reader as trivial and the second as
extravagant, but this is exactly the point. These examples (as well as more
systematic studies along the lines of Kelly, 1996) bring to light that we
already had an implicit reference class of experiments in mind, which did not
include emptying the whole bag at once or performing a superexperiment.
For a more realistic example, consider a physical theory that can only be
tested by building a particle accelerator the size of the solar system. Clearly,
resource constraints make falsifying such a theory (quasi-)impossible. This
indicates that the binary distinction between possibility and impossibility
of falsification does not tell the whole story and that practical constraints
should be taken into account. This general observation (also made, for
instance, by Carroll, 2019) applies to probabilistic theories, too.
At this point, we hope that we have convinced the reader that the (de-
gree of) falsifiability of a hypothesis co-depends on the severity of available
experiments. Hence, we should include the experimental context in our for-
mal models. Following Milne (1995), we formalize an experiment as a finite,
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive set of propositions (equivalent to
a partition of the sample space of the probability function, P , associated
with the probabilistic hypothesis at hand). In a probabilistic context, the
goal of learning from experiments is to reduce the uncertainty concerning
a variable of interest; formally, this uncertainty can be modeled using an
entropy measure (Crupi et al., 2018). Shannon entropy is one well-known
measure, but there are other options.
2.3 Severity
The experimental context plays a key role in the notion of the severity of
a test, for which quantifiable measures have been proposed in the litera-
ture. As discussed by Kuipers (2000, pp. 60–62), Popper’s (1983) notion of
severity refers to the “improbability of the prediction”. Possibly, then, the
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qualitative notion of severity can be viewed as giving us degrees of falsifia-
bility. This will be our working hypothesis in this section.
Severity can be defined as expected disconfirmation (as proposed by
Milne, 1995) and can be related to entropy. We illustrate this in detail
for an example in Appendix B. Severity can also be related to boldness as
follows: relative to a reference set of possible experiments (which could rep-
resent, say, all experiments that are possible at a given point in time), we can
define the boldness of a hypothesis as the maximum severity of tests of the
hypothesis. We owe this suggestion to Wayne Myrvold (personal communi-
cation), who also observed that the confirmation measure can be relativized
by working through the derivation in Appendix B from bottom to top: in-
stead of considering the Kullback–Leibler divergence, one could start from
the family of Rényi divergences, which can be related to a family of severity
measures. On the one hand, a special case of Rényi entropy measures is the
Hartley entropy, which is of interest to our Popperian project since the ex-
pected entropy reduction associated with this measure is positive just in case
the test has a possible outcome that excludes at least one of the hypotheses
under study (Crupi et al., 2018). This is in line with Popper’s (1959) fal-
sificationism, which advises learners to seek to falsify hypotheses. On the
other hand, if outright falsification is not taken to be the guiding notion,
the definition of entropy could be generalized even beyond Rényi entropies,
to a two-parameter family of entropy measures (Crupi et al., 2018).
Remark that, like Milne (1995), we assume that an ideal experiment
induces a partition on the sample space. So, all possible experiments can
be represented by considering the lattice of partitions. Typically, as science
advances, experiments become more precise, resulting in a refinement of
the experimental partition. A more radical change in experimental context
occurs when qualitatively different phenomena become measurable: this is
closely related to severe theory change and, like the corresponding aspect of
riskiness, we will not consider it here.
Real-world experiments are not ideal, due to measurement errors. This,
together with the Duhem–Quine problem and the issue of underdetermi-
nation of theories by empirical evidence, obviously complicates matters of
outright falsification or verification. Here we will not go into these com-
plications, but observe that measurement error can be represented by an
additional probability distribution. (For an example of a Bayesian account,
see, e.g., Jefferys & Berger, 1992.)
Our discussion so far suggests a desideratum for an adequate formal
representation of the notion of gradable falsifiability. Observe that, in the
context of probabilistic theories, the language of the theory takes the shape
of a partition on the sample space, as does the experimental context. This
allows for a unified treatment. Hence, we require that degrees of falsifiability
should depend on these two algebras:
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1. an algebra related to the language of the theory, and
2. an algebra related to the experimental context.
In the next section, we turn to the question of how the falsiability of
probabilistic theories compares to non-probabilistic ones.
2.4 Deterministic versus indeterministic theories
Thyssen & Wenmackers (2020) proposed a classification of theories in terms
of how much freedom they allow. Although their classification was presented
in a different context (the free-will debate), it is suggestive of an ordering
in terms of falsifiability.1 On their proposal, Class I theories are determin-
istic and Class II theories are probabilistic. However, the latter do not
include all indeterministic theories. Probabilistic theories specify all possi-
ble outcomes and assign probabilities to all of them. This leaves room for
two additional classes of theories: Class III theories allow for probability
gaps and Class IV theories also allow for possibility gaps.
Class I theories are deterministic and complete. Note that a deterministic
theory without free variables can be regarded as an extreme case: it
assigns probability one to a single possible outcome; all other possi-
bilities are assigned probability zero. Also note that this notion of
determinism includes completeness, which is stronger than usual: in-
complete theories such as “All F s are Gs” are usually considered to
be deterministic, although they remain silent on atomic possibilities;
in this classification, they belong to Class III (see below).
Class II theories are probabilistic. Within this class, some theories may as-
sign prior probability density zero to a subset of the possibility space:
the larger this set of probability zero, the closer this theory is to Class
I. Theories that do not assign prior probability zero to any subset of
the possibility space can accommodate any possible empirical obser-
vation of frequencies, albeit not all with the same probability: the
more spread out the probability assignments, the lower the degree of
falsifiability. All else being equal, equiprobability leads to the lowest
degree of falsifiability, although it does satisfy other theoretic virtues
(such as simplicity of description and symmetry).
Class III theories have probability gaps: they specify all possible outcomes
and may even specify relative probabilities for a subset of possible
events, but they do not specify probabilities for all possible outcomes.
This class includes theories that yield predictions with free variables or
fudge factors that are not constrained by a probability measure. Like
1We thank Pieter Thyssen for an early discussion on this possible connection.
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Class II theories, theories in this class can accommodate any possi-
ble empirical observation of frequencies, but they do not even assign
probabilities to them. The third pundit’s prediction from Section 1
(“the market will fluctuate”) belongs to this class: it does not assign
probabilities to the different ways in which the market might fluctuate.
Class IV theories have possibility gaps: they allow for radically new pos-
sibilities, not specified by the theory, to be realized. They may specify
some possible outcomes, and even some relative probabilities of a sub-
set of possible events, but at least under some circumstances they allow
for radical openness regarding possible outcomes. The most extreme
theory in this class takes the form: “anything can happen.” According
to Popper’s demarcation criterion, that is the opposite of a scientific
theory, because this statement cannot be falsified by any data. Its de-
gree of falsifiability should equal the minimal value of the scale. One
could even argue that they are not theories at all, but observe that,
except for the extreme case, theories belonging to this class may offer
a probabilistic or even a deterministic description of certain situations.
This classification mainly tracks informativeness (increasing from Class IV
to Class I), which we already know to correlate with riskiness and falsifia-
bility, but it does not yet account for the experimental context. Again, this
is important: when taking into account the empirical measurement errors
in a probabilistic way, even a deterministic theory will lead to a strongly
spiked probability distribution at best (as already mentioned at the end of
Section 2.3). That is, even though Class I theories are maximally falsifiable
in principle, measurement errors prevent even such theories to be perfectly
falsifiable in practice and, as mentioned before, the Duhem–Quine problem
complicates which conclusion should be drawn even in cases where outright
falsifiability seems feasible.
Let us now briefly elaborate on the possibility of empirical equivalence
of theories in the light of possible outright falsification. (Alternatively, one
could define this for any degree of (dis-)confirmation, but our focus in this
section is on decisive evidence.) Our approach is inspired by Sklar’s (1975)
work on “transient underdetermination”, which refers to in-principle differ-
ences between theories that are not measurable on present empirical evi-
dence. Likewise, we relativize the notion of empirical equivalence to a given
empirical context. In terms of falsification, two theories, τ1 and τ2, are
empirically equivalent relative to an experimental context E , if every experi-
ment ei ∈ E that can decide τ1 can decide τ2, and vice versa. In particular, it
may happen that two theories that belong to different classes are empirically
equivalent relative to the current experimental context. For example, con-
sider two different approaches to quantum mechanics: while Bohmian me-
chanics belongs to Class I, spontaneous collapse theories belong to Class
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II. They are empirically indistinguishable relative to the current experimen-
tal context, but this need not remain the case when experimental resolution
improves in the future.
Instead of only quantifying over the elements in a given class of exper-
iments, we can also quantify over the reference classes of experiments. For
instance, if a theory τ1 can be decided by any reference class of experiments
that can decide a theory τ2, we can say that τ1 is at least as decidable as
τ2. If the converse holds as well, then τ1 and τ2 are empirically equivalent
simpliciter (which need not imply that τ1 and τ2 are logically equivalent, of
course).
At first sight, this analysis gives us no ground for preferring one among
two (or more) theories that are empirically equivalent relative to the cur-
rent experimental context. However, if we take into account the possibility
of future refinements (or even radical changes) to the experimental context,
it may still give grounds for preferring the theory that belongs to the low-
est class number (and among those, the one that is the most precise) —
provided, of course, the required future experimental improvement that dis-
tinguishes among the theories is achievable at all. While Milne’s severity
measure does not take this into account, it could in principle be extended
with an expectation ranging over changes of E .
This vindicates a preference for deterministic theories over indetermin-
istic ones, and for fully probabilistic theories over underdescribed one. This
is so, not due to any preconceptions about determinism or chance in the
world, but simply because testing maximally falsifiable theories first allows
us to weed out untenable options as fast as possible. Not because Class I
theories are more likely to be true than theories of Class II and beyond, or
even closer to the truth, but because they make maximally risky predictions
and hence are maximally easy to refute when false. This seems a solution to
Wheeler’s problem (1956, p. 360; also quoted approvingly by Popper, 1972):
Our whole problem is to make the mistakes as fast as possible
[. . . ]
A similar tension pertains to the other end of the spectrum. In the
face of the fallibility of science, acknowledging that there may be, as of yet,
unknown possibilities seems virtuous. This would suggest a preference for
Class IV theories, rather than Class I. However, the parts of the theory
that lead to it being Class IV have low to minimal falsifiability. Therefore,
we argue that acknowledging the possibility of radical uncertainty should
happen preferably only at the meta-theoretical level. This prevents a con-
flict with the virtue of falsifiability as well as most of the difficulties in for-
malizing radical uncertainty. Again, this is related to the second dimension
of riskiness: conceptual novelty. Theories of Class IV should be consid-
ered as last resorts, if all else fails, and given the infinitude of alternatives
to explore, temporary theories of this kind can always be superseded.
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This concludes our discussion of degrees of falsifiability. In the next sec-
tion, we turn our attention to a different question: how to define a measure
of truthlikeness? Some of the notions that we explored in this section will
reappear. For instance, it will turn out that the language of the theory is
crucially important in both contexts.
3 Formal frameworks for truthlikeness and approx-
imate truth
Various authors have contributed to improving our understanding of truth-
likeness and approximate truth through formal work, such as Schurz &
Weingartner (1987), Gemes (2007), Schurz & Weingartner (2010), Niiniluoto
(2011), and Cevolani & Schurz (2017). As far as we know, however, these
ideas have not yet been applied explicitly to probabilistic theories.
One thing we appreciate about these studies is that they show how cen-
tral concepts from the traditional debates in philosophy of science can be
formalized and applied to other subjects in epistemology. An illustration of
this is the elegant approach to the preface paradox, presented by Cevolani
& Schurz (2017).
Drawing on these formal and quantitative accounts of Popperian ideas
from the truthlikeness literature, we can take a fresh look at the Poppe-
rian theme from our previous section: falsifiability, which has so far eluded
proper formalization and lacks a quantitative account. One of the dimen-
sions of Popperian riskiness that we identified in Section 2 and that seems
a crucial ingredient for any measure of falsifiability was informativeness. As
we will see at the end of Section 3.1, the content of a theory emerges as a
natural measure of informativeness from the Schurz–Weingartner–Cevolani
framework.
3.1 Review of the Schurz–Weingartner–Cevolani consequence
approaches
The aforementioned formal literature on verisimilitude has developed some
quantitative ways of comparing the verisimilitude of theories as well as their
approximate truth. In particular, Cevolani & Schurz (2017) have proposed
full definitions of verisimilitude and approximate truth, which we will restate
below for ease of reference. Before we can do so, however, we have to sketch
some of the background of the Schurz–Weingartner–Cevolani framework.
First, Schurz & Weingartner (1987) tackled verisimilitude by defining a
notion of the relevant consequences of a theory. One can make sense of rele-
vant consequences in both propositional languages and first-order languages.
Any given theory, τ , gives rise to a set of true relevant consequences, Et(τ),
and a set of false relevant consequences, Ef (τ). Theories are then compared
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by means of the sets of their relevant consequences.
Next, Schurz & Weingartner (2010) built further on this account to give
a quantitative definition of truthlikeness for theories represented by relevant
elements (those relevant consequences that are not logically equivalent to
a conjunction of shorter relevant consequences) in a propositional language
with a fixed number of variables, n. Definition 5 in Section 5 of their paper
is important for our purposes, so we include a version of it here. This ver-
sion takes into account two modifications introduced by Cevolani & Schurz
(2017), who added the parameter φ > 0 to balance the relative weight of
misses compared to matches, and normalized through division by n (cf. Def-
inition 9 in their paper):
Definition 1. Cevolani–Schurz: quantitative truthlikeness for a theory τ ,
















n! if α ∈ Et(τ)
−φn
(n−kα+1)!
n! if α ∈ Ef (τ),
where kα equals the number of α’s literals and vα equals the number of α’s
true literals. The truthlikeness for Verum (⊤) and Falsum (⊥) is set by the
following convention: Trφ(⊤) := 0 and Trφ(⊥) := −φ(n+ 1)/n.
On this proposal, evaluating the truthlikeness of a theory boils down to a
lot of bookkeeping. The major upside of this account is its naturalness: the
more true statements (of a certain kind) a theory makes, the better. More-
over, the less contaminated these true statements are with false statements,
the higher the bonus.
In addition, Cevolani & Schurz (2017) introduced a separate notion of
approximate truth, which expresses closeness to being true, irrespective of
how many other things may be true outside the scope of the hypothesis
under consideration (cf. Definition 10 in their article). In this context, we
want to assess amounts of content, rather than bonuses versus penalties,
so we suppress the subscript φ by setting its value to unity, as follows:
Tr(α) := Trφ=1(α).









On this account, it is natural to think of Et(τ) as the truth content of
τ and of Ef (τ) as the falsity content of τ . The corresponding quantitative
measures of truth content (TC) and falsity content (FC) of a theory τ could
be defined as follows.










Content(τ) := TC(τ) + |FC(τ)|.
For true τ1 and τ1 |= τ2, it holds that Content(τ1) ≥ Content(τ2),
as proven in Appendix C. This is intuitively compelling in light of the first
dimension of riskiness (informativeness), which tracks the amount of content.
Using this notation, and now also suppressing φ in the formula for quan-
titative truthlikeness, we can bring the essential form of the Cevolani–Schurz
definitions into clear focus:






The measure of truth content, TC, is always positive and acts as a reward
in the definition of truthlikeness. The measure of falsity content, FC, is
always negative and acts as a penalty in the definition of truthlikeness.
We can now apply these ideas to riskiness and falsifiability, as announced
at the start of Section 3. The first dimension of riskiness, informativeness,
can now be understood as the Content of a theory. Ceteris paribus, as
the Content of a theory increases, its falsifiability increases. Notice that
this provides a way of measuring content that does not depend on relative
logical strength alone. On the one hand, provided that τ1 and τ2 are true,
τ1 |= τ2 implies Trφ(τ1) ≥ Trφ(τ2). (This follows from Content(τ1) ≥
Content(τ2), as shown above; it was also shown in Schurz & Weingartner,
1987.) On the other hand, one can also consider theories τ1 and τ2 such that
Content(τ1) < Content(τ2) while τ2 ̸|= τ1. However, when we will turn our
attention away from propositional logic towards probabilistic theories, which
are a special kind of quantitative theories, merely tracking the fraction of
correct assignments without measuring the distance of wrong assignments
to the correct values will become implausible.
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3.2 Content of probabilistic theories
The main thrust of the approach reviewed in the previous section is that
there are meaningful notions of truth content and falsity content to begin
with. Before the advent of this approach, it seemed that content alone would
never suffice to capture intuitively compelling desiderata about the structure
of a truthlikeness ordering. To see this, consider a falsehood that constitutes
a near miss: for instance, a long conjunction of many true atomic conjuncts
and only one false conjunct. If we compare this to a tautology, which is
the least informative kind of true statement, we would intuitively judge the
former to be more truthlike than the latter. However, Tichý (1974) and
Miller (1974) have both shown that, as long as we define the content of
a theory as the set of sentences closed under the consequence relation, a
tautology always ranks as more truthlike than any false theory. Cevolani
& Schurz (2017) saves their notions of truth content and falsity content
from the Tichý–Miller wrecking ball by restricting the notion of relevant
consequence. The approach to truth content and falsity content proposed
by Gemes (2007) proceeds along similar lines.
Our goal here goes beyond what was already achieved by these authors:
we aim to consider the truthlikeness of probabilistic theories. An impor-
tant hurdle is that there do not seem to be well-behaved counterparts to
truth content and falsity content. We now give two examples that illustrate
problems at the heart of all the issues we discuss below.
Example 3. (Coarse-graining to a subalgebra) Assume the following prob-
abilistic theory is true. It is characterized by the probability space ⟨Ω,A, P ⟩
determined by the sample space Ω := {A,B,C}, the σ-algebra A := P(Ω),
and the probability function P ({A}) := 0.2; P ({B}) := 0.5; P ({C}) :=
0.3. In this probability space, the following holds: P ({A,B}) = 0.7 and
P ({C}) = 0.3.
There are many other probability measures over the σ-algebra A that
satisfy this requirement, too. This is related to the following observation:
{A,B} and {C} uniquely determine a single subalgebra of A: {∅, {A,B},
{C},Ω}.
Now compare two theories probabilistic theories (which we will denote by
T rather than τ) TL and TM that both get everything right on this subalgebra:
TL says nothing else, while TM also includes probability assignments to {A}
and {B}. We are now faced with a trade-off. Clearly TM has more content,
but if that content is very unlike the true theory, the truthlikeness of TM
might be lower than that of TL. (This can also be nicely illustrated in terms
of our own proposal, as we will see in Example 8 in Section 4.3.)
Example 3 illustrates the importance of aligning the notion of content
with the “ambient structure”, in particular, with the σ-algebra of the true
probability space and coarse-grained versions of it. This is actually a quite
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natural requirement, in that it tracks our intuition regarding the relation
between content and logical strength. The next example shows that a prob-
abilistic theory can be wrong on all non-trivial events and still be very close
to the truth.
Example 4. (Wrong probabilities for all non-trivial events) Building on
the previous example, we can complicate matters further by considering two
theories Q and R, such that Q({A}) := 0.2;Q({B}) := 0.1;Q({C}) := 0.7
and R({A}) := 0.18;R({B}) := 0.51;R({C}) := 0.31. Clearly, R only
assigns the right values to the events ∅ and Ω. Q, on the other hand, gets
the event {A} right as well. Yet intuitively, R seems to lie closer to P than
Q does.
Both examples illustrate that in tracking the truthlikeness of probabilis-
tic theories, mere counting will no longer do. One reason is that the the-
ories come with a native structure, which allows approximation by coarse-
graining, so we cannot ignore this structure. Another reason is that the
theories we are comparing are inherently quantitative, so we will have to
switch from counting to measuring. This already applies for finite, discrete
sample spaces — on which we will focus here — and is exacerbated for
continuous distributions.
As a result, the orthodox consequence approach to verisimilitude no
longer suffices in the probabilistic context, where verisimilitude does not
depend on truth simpliciter. We need some content-specific measure to
determine how close to the truth a theory really is. Notions like truth
content and falsity content are therefore out of place. Issues like these just
do not pop up that often when one works in propositional logic or predicate
logic, so we feel that it is worthwhile to emphasize this nuance. Cevolani &
Schurz (2017) seem to agree with us, at least tacitly, because they introduced
a measure, App, to measure closeness in quantitative contexts, as we will
see below.
3.2.1 Representing probabilistic theories
Schurz & Weingartner (2010) are certainly right in claiming that philoso-
phers should take knowledge representation seriously. The difference be-
tween qualitative beliefs and quantitative beliefs is so large, however, that
we cannot simply transplant ideas regarding verisimilitude and approximate
truth from the qualitative setting to the quantitative setting. As mentioned
above, one of the key issues is that we do not have natural notions of truth
content and falsity content in this setting.
The proposal of Cevolani & Schurz (2017, section 7.2) is the only one we
are aware of that is applicable to quantitative theories. Still, they do not
consider probabilistic theories explicitly. Hence, the goal of this section is to
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fit probabilistic theories into the general mold they proposed for quantitative
theories.
Cevolani & Schurz (2017) started by assuming that there is an object, a,
that has various magnitudes, including Xi. The true value of this particular
magnitude is assumed to be Xi(a) = r
∗
i . Then they suggest a quantitative
theory τ is a conjunction with conjuncts of the form:
τi : Xi(a) = ri.
Furthermore, they require a measure, App, ranging over these conjuncts and
with the following properties:
1. App(τi) is the degree to which ri approximates the true value r
∗
i of the
magnitude Xi for object a.
2. App(τi) ranges between −1 and 1, where App(τi) = 1 means that
ri = r
∗
i and App(τi) = −1 means that the distance between ri and r∗i
is maximal.
To apply this to probabilistic theories, we consider the following choices
for a, Xi and ri:
 a is a process or situation characterized by a probability space, includ-
ing probability function P ;
 i indexes an event, Ei, from the algebra of P (or an equivalent propo-
sition);
 and Xi is some evaluation function associated with said event, such
that Xi(a) = P (Ei) = ri, where ri a real number in the unit interval.
Using App, Cevolani & Schurz (2017) proposed the following measure of
verisimilitude for quantitative theories:
Definition 4. Cevolani–Schurz: verisimilitude for quantitative theories.
Let App be an adequate measure that measures how well ri approximates r
∗
i ,
the true value of Xi(a) for the relevant a. We define the verisimilitude for












The definition in Equation 2 has the familiar form: like in Equation 1,
the first term rewards statements that approximate the truth well enough,
while the second term penalizes statements that do not.
The driving force of the Schurz–Weingartner–Cevolani tradition consists
of relevant consequences. Hence, we should assume that the theory τ is
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written down in terms of its elementary consequences. Unfortunately, it
is not exactly clear from a mathematical perspective what elementary con-
sequences in a quantitative context comprehend. So, there remains some
work to be done to determine what a probabilistic theory τ written down in
terms of its elementary consequences looks like. We assume that it includes
all the probability assignments for the events in the sub-σ-algebra on which
the theory is defined without the assignments of 1 to Ω and 0 to ∅. 2,3
To illustrate the proposal, let us now reconsider the theories TL and TM
from Example 3. In terms of its elementary consequences, we believe that
TL should be written down as
4
TL = (L({A,B}) = rAB;L({C}) = rC)
and that TM should be written down as
TM = (M({A}) = rA;M({B}) = rB;M({C}) = rC ;M({A,B}) = rAB;
M({A,C}) = rAC ;M({B,C}) = rBC).
From now on, we will employ an abuse of notation: if α is a conjunct of
a theory τ presented in terms of its elementary consequences, we will denote
this by α ∈ τ . For instance, we can write: M({A,B}) = rAB ∈ TM . Now
let us consider Tr1(TL) and Tr1(TM ). We can see that






In Example 3 we assumed that M was way off the mark on A and B. Let
us assume then that 1n
∑
τi∈(TM−TL)App(τi) is negative. In this case
Tr1(TM ) ≥ Tr1(TL),
which is what we intuitively expect. If, on the other hand, M lies fairly
close to P , then 1n
∑
τi∈(TM−TL)App(τi) should be positive. In that case
Tr1(TM ) ≤ Tr1(TL),
2The reasoning for including all events, Ei, where the relevant probability measure is
defined is thus: first, if P (E1) = r1;P (E2) = r2;P (E1∩E2) = 0, then P (E1∪E2) = r1+r2
is a relevant consequence. Indeed, we cannot replace E1 or E2 by just any event salva
validate. Secondly, it does not seem the case that P (E1 ∪ E2) = r1 + r2 is equivalent
to conjunctions of elements of the form Xi(a) = ri. For instance, P (E1) = r1;P (E2) =
r2;P (E1 ∩ E2) = 0 is stronger than P (E1 ∪ E2) = r1 + r2.
3We have omitted the events ∅ and Ω because otherwise the trivial theory, Ttrivial :=
(Ptrivial(Ω) = 1;Ptrivial(∅) = 0), would always get assigned a high verisimilitude, which
would be counterintuitive. Our choice allows us to set the default value for the trivial
theories to 0. If one is not working in a set-theoretic context, one can just replace ∅ and
Ω by the ⊥ and ⊤ elements of the algebra respectively.
4Note that consequences of the form L({A,C}) ≥ rc are not elementary, since we could
replace A by any element of Ω. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing
us in this direction.
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which also makes sense. Let us quickly summarize: TL and TM will be as-
signed the same values for elementary statements that they have in common.
The more fine-grained theory, TM , also has the chance to get a bonus or a
penalty for the statements it does not share with TL.
In the preceding example, we have assumed that App takes on both
positive and negative values (in agreement with the second requirement for
App by Cevolani & Schurz, 2017). In fact, there is no straightforward way to
amend the theory such that App can only take negative or positive values.5
Hence, we cannot simply define App(M(E) = rE) := |rE − pE |, where pE is
the value that the true probability function assigns to event E. Moreover,
the observation also rules out defining App as a statistical distance, which
is a pity since it makes it harder to tie in this approach with existing work.
(We return to this point in the next section.)
Again, without the full formal framework for thinking about relevant
consequences in quantitative or probabilistic settings, the above account
remains speculative. Further logical research is needed to assess whether
the above account holds up as a concrete example of a Schurz–Weingartner–
Cevolani-style theory of verisimilitude or as a variant. The ideas outlined
here should make us hopeful for a well-behaved theory.
3.2.2 Candidates for App
If we try to apply Definition 4 to probabilistic theories, we need to make a
choice for the measure of approximation, App. As shown above, the range
of App cannot simply be a subset of either R+ or R−, but has to take on
both positive and negative values. This means that App needs to distinguish
elementary consequences that perform ‘well enough’ qua likeness to truth
(by assigning a positive value to them) from those that do not (by assigning a
negative value). Given that it is usually better that the proposed probability
of an event E lies close to the real probability of E, it is natural to work
with a threshold: App assigns positive values to probabilities that differ by
less than the threshold, negative values to those that differ more, and zero
5Suppose that the range of App would be (a subset of) R+. Then Tr(TM ) ≥ Tr(TL),
no matter how accurate or inaccurate TM is on (TM − TL). Indeed, on the assumption
that the range of App is (a subset of) R+, we have that App(τi) ≥ 0 for all τi ∈ (TM −TL).






In other words, if the range of App is (a subset of) R+, any theory TM that implies TL
has a higher truthlikeness than TL, irrespective of its likeness qua truth on (TM − TL).
Similarly, if the range of App was (a subset of) R−, any theory TM that would imply TL
would be lower in truthlikeness than TL, irrespective of its likeness qua truth on (TM−TL).
Neither option captures how truthlikeness should behave. To avoid this, the range of App
should include both positive and negative real values.
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to those exactly at the threshold. How large the threshold ought to be might
be context-dependent.
One way to meet the criteria for such a measure is as follows, where
ϵ ∈ ]0, 1] is the threshold and each Ti is an element of theory T that assigns





















where r∗i is the true value of P (Ei).
Consider, for example, an event Ei with a true probability r
∗
i = 0.7
and consider a threshold ϵ = 0.1, then the corresponding graph of Appϵ is
depicted in Fig. 2.
Figure 2: Numerical example of Appϵ as a function of ri (the probability
value that Ti assigns to the event of interest), for true probability r
∗
i = 0.7
and threshold ϵ = 0.1.
Alternatively, we could consider a definition in which all occurrences of
|r∗i − ri| are replaced, mutatis mutandis, by (r∗i − ri)2 for instance. So, while
we do not find a definition for the measure of approximation that is uniquely
well-motivated, at this point it might look like we have an almost complete
account.
Example 5. (Appϵ-based truthlikeness for P and Q) Let us now illustrate
this proposal for App by considering the probability functions P , Q, and R
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from Examples 3 and 4. We stipulated that P was the true distribution and
both Q and R are defined on the full algebra A. When we apply Definition 5
with ϵ = 0.1, we obtain the numerical values of App listed below:
App(Q({A}) = 0.2) = 1 App(R({A}) = 0.18) = 1− 0.02
0.1
= 0.8
App(Q({B}) = 0.1) = −3
4
App(R({B}) = 0.51) = 1− 0.01
0.1
= 0.9
App(Q({C}) = 0.7) = −1
2
App(R({C}) = 0.31) = 1− 0.01
0.1
= 0.9
App(Q({A,C} = 0.9) = −3
4
App(R({A,C} = 0.49) = 1− 0.01
0.1
= 0.9
App(Q({A,B} = 0.3) = −1
2
App(R({A,B} = 0.69) = 1− 0.01
0.1
= 0.9
App(Q({B,C} = 0.8) = 1 App(R({B,C} = 0.82) = 1− 0.02
0.1
= 0.8
The truthlikeness for TR and TQ can now be calculated by plugging these
























We see that Tr(TR) > Tr(TQ), as we would intuitively expect.
In the next section, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of App-
based approaches in a more general setting.
3.3 Taking stock of consequence approaches for verisimili-
tude of probabilistic theories
Initially, we were rather sceptical towards the applicability of Schurz–Weingartner–
Cevolani-style approaches to verisimilitude of probabilistic theories.6 We
have since warmed up considerably to this approach and related ideas. As
mentioned above, we are hopeful that further research will yield a well-
behaved theory. Nevertheless, we still believe that this approach might also
be plagued by some issues. These issues all revolve around the same theme:
the framework’s limited compatibility with important ideas from informa-
tion theory.
Firstly, App forces us to compare distributions on all events that are in
the set of elementary consequences. As such, App as envisioned by Cevolani
6We are thankful to the referees for making us reconsider our assessment.
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& Schurz (2017) does not seem very flexible. Indeed, if one only wants to
compare distributions on a couple of specific events, one might run into
problems. Secondly, while the threshold-based construction for App that we
considered in the previous section is adequate (in the sense of the criteria
reviewed in Section 3.2.1), it remains artificial in the context of information
theory. Usually, probability distributions are compared by (pre-)distances,
but there is no such ready-made candidate for App, because it needs to take
both positive and negative values (as explained in footnote 5).
Presumably, when Cevolani & Schurz (2017) developed their account
for quantitative theories, they had in mind measures that are qualitatively
different, such as the mass and the length of an object. As such, applying it
to probabilistic theories is off-label use and we should not be surprised that
we obtain heterodox proposals.
The approach we develop below is not a Schurz–Weingartner–Cevolani
framework. Nevertheless, we are still indebted to their approach since we
compare theories in terms of their ambient logical structure. The following
example will allow us to quickly revisit some of the Popperian themes.
Example 6. (High and low resolution) Consider a theory, TC , that is de-
fined with respect to the Boolean algebra with semantic atoms A1, A2, . . . ,
A100 and another theory, TX , that is defined on an algebra with ‘atoms’





(C and X refer to the Roman numerals for 100 and 10, respectively.)
Theory TC consists of the following set of 100 statements:
TC := {PC(Ai) = 0.01 | i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 100}} .
Theory TX consists of the following set of 10 statements:
TX := {PX(Bi) = 0.1 | i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}} .
In this case, TX can be regarded as a low-resolution or coarse-grained version
of TC , since (i) the algebra of TX only contains unions of elements of the
algebra of TC and (ii) the probabilities that TX assigns to these unions are
equal to the sum of probabilities that TC assigns to the composing sets. In
other words, where they are both defined, the probability assignments agree,
and the cases where the probability is defined on TX form a strict subset of
the cases where the probability is defined on TC . If we assume TC is true,
so is TX , but TC will be assigned a higher verisimilitude than TX .
This example is analogous to the case of non-probabilistic theories dif-
fering in information content and precision (cf. Section 2). In practice, fine-
graining can come into view due to theoretical refinement or due to increases
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in measurement resolution. Observe that there may also be theories that
are more fine-grained in some aspects and more coarse-grained in others, so
the order need not be total.
We acknowledge that the ambient logical structure and the relations it
induces between theories are an essential part of a good understanding of
verisimilitude and related Popperian notions. At the same time, we believe
that we also need to look at the content of the theories, when considering
the probabilistic case. A probabilistic theory might have little to no (non-
trivial) true consequences at all, while still being a very good approximation
(recall Example 3 and its subsequent discussion). The crux of Popperian
verisimilitude consists in notions of true and false consequence. Indeed,
Schurz & Weingartner (2010) as well as Oddie (2016) show that Popper’s
account of verisimilitude can best be regarded as a consequence account.
Even though we do not claim that more impure consequence accounts like
Cevolani & Schurz’s (2017) App-based approach are doomed to fail, we do
not aim to resolve these issues in our own account either. We side-step the
issue because our proposal below is not a consequence account.
4 Towards an alternative definition of truthlike-
ness for probabilistic theories
At this point, we step away from the account that was based on propositional
logic. Our goal here is to come up with an adequate alternative notion of
verisimilitude that takes the structure of the underlying σ-algebra (which
allows coarse-graining) into account. In Section 4.4, we will consider the
analogous question for approximate truth. Our main topic in this section,
however, is the notion of truthlikeness in the context of probabilistic theories.
Our goal is not to give a full, formal account, which would constitute a
complete research program in itself, requiring technical work akin to that of
Schurz & Weingartner (1987) and Gemes (2007). Instead, our more modest
aim here is twofold. First, we want to show that we can apply some central
Popperian ideas to probabilistic theories. Secondly, we want to suggest
some pitfalls and desiderata for the development of a fully fledged formal
account along these lines. We believe, in the spirit of Russell’s epigraph,
that propositional logic or possible-world accounts cannot hope to capture
actual scientific theories; neither can the alternative we wish to prepare for.
Much like how scientists use the harmonic oscillator or other toy models
and idealizations, we use formal methods to study specific aspects of science
itself — without any pretense of being able to capture all aspects of actual
examples of scientific theories. In other words, the point of our work is to
expand the “abstract imagination” and thus to help us pinpoint fundamental
issues.
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4.1 Compatibility of probabilistic theories at a certain level
of grain
We consider probabilistic theories that are fully specified by listing the prob-
ability assignments to the events that form the basis of a σ-algebra. From
here on, we will refer to probabilistic theories by their probability function.
In Example 6, we have encountered a case of “compatibility” between prob-
ability functions that were defined on algebras with a different resolution.
Let us now turn this idea into a general definition.
Definition 6. Compatibility of refinements.
Consider two probability functions, P defined on algebra A and P ′ defined
on algebra A′ that is a subalgebra of A. We say that probability distribution
P is a compatible refinement of P ′ if P ′(E) = P (E) for each event E in
A′.
In this case, P ′ is called a compatible coarsening of P ; P and P ′ are
said to be compatible with each other.
So, to determine whether two probabilistic theories are compatible, we
compare their probability functions at the level of the coarsest algebra among
the two. Clearly, this comparison only makes sense when the algebra of one
probability function is a subalgebra of the other, as is indeed required by the
definition. Another way of coarsening that could in principle be considered
is related to rounding probability values. This is not what we are dealing
with here, but it could help to restrict the set of all possible probability
functions to a finite set.
If we apply Definition 6 to Example 6, we see that PC is a compatible
refinement of PX . Also observe that any probability function on any non-
trivial algebra is a compatible refinement of the trivial (0, 1)-probability
function on the minimal algebra (containing only the empty set and the
sample space).
We denote the compatibility of a coarser probability distribution P ′ with
P by P ′ ≤ P , which is read as: P ′ is a compatible coarsening of P . The
symbol “≤” is fitting, since the compatible coarsening relation is reflexive
(P ≤ P for all P ), antisymmetric (P ′ ≤ P and P ≤ P ′ implies P ′ = P ),
and transitive (P ′′ ≤ P ′ and P ′ ≤ P implies P ′′ ≤ P ); hence, it is a partial
order.
Given an algebra A and a probability function P ′ on A′, which is a
subalgebra of A, there may be many compatible refinements defined on an
algebra B such that A′ ⊆ B ⊆ A. We now fix a collection of compatible
refinements to a given, coarser probability function in the following way.
First, we fix a finite set of probability functions on subalgebras of A, calling
it DA. Then, for a probability function P
′ defined on a subalgebra of A,
we call DA(P





′) := {P ∈ DA | P ′ ≤ P},
which is a set of compatible refinements of P ′. The idea behind this notion
is sketched in Fig. 3.
Figure 3: Schematic representation of a set of compatible refinements of a
probability function on a coarser algebra.
4.2 Quantifying verisimilitude of probabilistic theories
A natural way to define the likeness between two probabilistic theories would
be to consider a statistical (pre-)distance (such as the Kullback–Leibler di-
vergence or the Jensen–Shannon distance, to name but two examples) be-
tween their probability functions. However, these (pre-)distances are only
defined if the two functions have the same domain. We want to define the
truthlikeness of a probabilistic theory, so we need to compare a hypothe-
sized probability function with the true probability function. Since these
will typically have a different domain, we need to do a little more work first.
To achieve this, we consider the set of compatible probability functions that
are defined on the same domain as the true probability function.
This way, verisimilitude can be defined as follows:
Definition 7. Verisimilitude of a probabilistic theory.
Let P ∗ be the true probability function and A its algebra. Let DA be a finite
set of probability functions on subalgebras of A, with P ∗ ∈ DA. Let P ′ be a
probability function on a subalgebra of A. Given a statistical (pre-)distance







m(P ∗, P ).
7In principle, we should write TrA,m rather than Trm, but the reference algebra A is
usually clear from the context.
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The idea here is simple. For every P ′, we calculate the average “penalty”
(hence the minus sign) that the distributions in its associated set of com-
patible refinements DA(P
′) accrue. There are good reasons to opt for the
average penalty here. By proposing a theory with a more coarse-grained
probability function P ′, one casts a wider net: this way, one has a better
chance to catch some of the theories that lie close to the truth (P ∗), but one
risks ensnaring some very inadequate theories as well.
The idea presented in Definition 7 is similar in flavor to the Tichý–Oddie
average measure of verisimilitude, V s (Oddie, 1986). Their proposal was
made in a possible-world context. The verisimilitude of the theory was then
calculated as unity minus the average distance from the worlds w′ covered
by a given theory τ to the actual world w. In other words:





Instead of possible worlds, we use the probabilistic theories P that are com-
patible with a given theory P ′.8 Similar ideas have recently been explored
by Cevolani & Festa (2020).
Let us briefly elaborate on the fact that we have assumed the algebra A
and the associated true probability function P ∗ to be the most fine-grained
among all probabilistic theories under consideration. This is related to an
important point raised by Kuipers (1982), who distinguished between de-
scriptive verisimilitude and theoretical verisimilitude: whereas descriptive
verisimilitude tracks the closeness of a descriptive statement to the true de-
scription of the actual world, theoretical verisimilitude tracks the closeness
of a candidate theory to the theoretical truth (which is compatible with more
than one physical possibility). Given that we assume the true probabilistic
theory (formulated in terms of A and P ∗) to be maximally fine-grained, it
may look as though we are dealing with the former. However, the very fact
that we start from a probabilistic theory shows otherwise: by their very
nature, probabilistic theories allow for multiple possibilities. To emphasize
this, we can exclude theories that assign all prior probability mass to a sin-
gleton. Moreover, the structure of the algebra typically does not include the
power set of the sample space. This shows that we aim to track theoretical
verisimilitude rather than descriptive verisimilitude. In addition, we allow
that scientists can usefully coarse-grain relative to A and P ∗, so we do not
presuppose that the true probabilistic theory is at the right level of grain
for all purposes.
In light of the previous section, some readers might expect us to opt
for an approach analogous to introducing an App function, with positive
and negative contributions. While this would in principle be possible, we
have chosen otherwise. Instead, we divide by |DA(P ′)|, in order to penalize
8We would like to thank an attentive referee for pointing this out.
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for coarseness. This factor is also related to riskiness and falsifiability: a
more coarse-grained probability function is compatible with a larger set of
refinements. Hence it is less risky and has a lower degree of falsifiability.
Example 7. (m-based truthlikeness of P and Q) To illustrate Definition 7,
let us again consider the theories R and Q from Examples 3 and 4. To
measure the distance between two probability distributions, P1 and P2 de-
fined on the same algebra A, we pick the Jensen–Shannon distance, mJS.9
Note that in this special case, where P and Q are specified on the same,
full algebra, the reference probability sets are singletons DA(Q) = {Q} and
DA(R) = {R}. Hence, comparing truthlikeness amounts to comparing the
Jensen–Shannon distances between P and Q, and between P and R. In this
case, we have that
TrmJS (P ) =
−1
1
mJS(P, P ) = 0,








Again, we find that R is more truthlike than Q, as we would intuitively
expect.
From the perspective of machine learning and finance, our approach
looks quite familiar, especially if we consider −Trm(P ′) instead of Trm(P ′):
m(P ∗, P ) plays the role of a loss function, the average of which we want to
minimize.10 So, −Trm(P ′), which averages over the possible losses, can be
considered to be a risk function that expresses the expected utility of P ′.
Definition 7 does not specify which statistical (pre-)distance m one has
to consider. Given that the literature on similarity between functions as
well as the literature on distances between statistical objects has produced
various measures, which capture different aspects of likeness, we currently
















∥∥∥∥ 12(P1 + P2)
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,
where DKL refers to the Kullback–Leibler divergence, in turn defined as:









with the base of the logarithm an arbitrary but fixed real > 1. We have chosen the natural
logarithm for our numerical results.
10The philosophical community is mostly familiar with utility functions. The mirror
image of these are loss functions, which are often used in finance and computer science.
Maximizing utility functions corresponds to minimizing loss functions, and vice versa.
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do not see a uniquely well-motivated choice among them for truthlikeness
either. A probabilistic theory may be very similar to the truth in some ways
and less so in a different way. It may depend on the context, such as the
goals of an inquiry, which of these aspects matters most. Hence, we have
chosen to relativize the notion of truthlikeness to the likeness measure at
hand.
Of course, there are additional variations on Definition 7 that we may
consider. For instance, we may increase the penalties by applying monotone








exp (m(P ∗, P )) .
4.3 Further relativization of verisimilitude of probabilistic
theories
As already mentioned, more coarse-grained probability functions, P ′, de-
fined on a smaller subalgebra A, cast a wider net, which we represented
by DA(P
′). There is an alternative way to define the relevant net. We
might, for instance, be interested in all probability distributions that lie
close to a given (set of) distributions. To do this we, define the notion of
ϵ-compatibility.
Definition 8. ϵ-compatibility of coarsenings.
Consider an algebra A and a non-empty but finite set, DA, of probability
functions on subalgebras of A. Consider a probability function P ∈ DA de-
fined on A and a probability function P ′, defined on a subalgebra of A. Fix
an ϵ ∈ R+0 and fix a (pre-)distance, m, on the space of probability distribu-
tions. We say that P ′ is an ϵ-compatible coarsening of P if there exists
a probability distribution Q ∈ DA(P ′) such that m(P,Q) < ϵ. In this case,
we call P an ϵ-compatible refinement of P ′.
We denote the set of distributions that are ϵ-compatible refinements of a
given distribution P ′ by DA,m,ϵ(P
′). This allows us to expand Definition 7
as follows.
Definition 9. ϵ-verisimilitude of a probabilistic theory.
Let P ∗ be the true probability function and A its algebra. Let DA be some
non-empty but finite set of probability functions defined on subalgebras of A.
Let P ′ be a probability function on a subalgebra of A. Given a statistical







m(P ∗, P ).
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This account, like that of Cevolani & Schurz (2017), features a param-
eter. In our account, ϵ plays a very different role than φ does in theirs:
by changing ϵ, we can change the scope of probability distributions that we
would like to capture by our theories, as the following example shows.
Example 8. Let us start again from Examples 3 and 4 and assume that P ,
Q, and R are distributions in some finite set of distributions that are under
consideration. For ease of presentation (and especially calculation), we take
the L∞ metric (which measures the distance between two discrete probability
distributions as the maximum of the distance between the probability assign-
ments over sets in the algebra). Further assume that P ′ is defined on the
algebra {∅, {A,B}, {C},Ω}, with P ′({A,B}) := 0.7 and P ′({C}) := 0.3. We
will, again for ease of presentation, also assume that P , Q, and R are the
only inhabitants of DA,L∞,0.1(P
′). We can now compare the truthlikeness of
the following theories: (1) DA,L∞,0.1(P
′), (2) DA,L∞(P
′), (3) DA,L∞,0.05(P ),
and (4) DA,L∞(P ).
1. Since DA,L∞,0.1(P




(0 + 0.4 + 0.02) = −0.14.
2. Since DA,L∞(P




(0 + 0.4) = −0.2.
3. Since DA,L∞,0.05(P ) = {P,R}, with Definition 9 we find that:
TrL∞,0.05(P ) = −
1
2
(0 + 0.02) = −0.01.
4. Since DA,L∞(P ) = {P}, Definition 7 shows:




We see all sorts of interesting behavior here. First, TrL∞(P ), the truth-
likeness of the theory containing only the true theory, is the highest of all
theories. This makes perfect sense: this theory has maximal likeness qua
truth and maximal content. Secondly, we can compare theories that do not
imply each other. For instance, we can see that TrL∞,0.05(P ) > TrL∞(P
′).
So, our proposal is not trivial in the sense that it only allows us to compare
theories that stand in a certain logical relation to one another. Finally, let
us have a look at how the truthlikeness of DA,L∞,0.1(P
′) relates to the truth-
likeness of DA,L∞(P




means the following: it is not necessarily the case that the truthlikeness in-
creases as the content increases. The proposal also takes into account how
close to the truth the stronger theory is. If the stronger theory has thrown
out a lot of good parts of the weaker theory, it might get assigned a lower
truthlikeness than the weaker theory. All of these are desirable properties for
a theory of truthlikeness.
Moreover, Definition 9 can be extended to second-order probabilistic
theories, which assign probabilities to elements of a set of (first-order) prob-
abilistic theories, using a weighted average over ϵ-verisimilitudes of the latter
(using the higher-order probabilities as weight factors).
Nevertheless, there is a major downside to Definition 9: if we coarsen P ′
to P ′′ in such a way that DA,m,ϵ(P
′′) − DA,m,ϵ(P ′) only contains distribu-




′′). This problem occurs because averaging “for-
gets” about the size of sets. In fact, this is a problem for all approaches to
verisimilitude that use averaging.
We can make verisimilitude “remember” the size of sets by dividing
the sum of m(P ∗, P ) by a factor smaller than |DA,m,ϵ(P ′)|. In order to
achieve this, we consider functions f : N0 → R that satisfy the following
three properties: (1) f(1) = 1, (2) f is increasing, and (3) n − f(n) is
monotonically increasing on N0. This entails that f(n) ≤ n for all n ∈ N0.
We will call these functions well-behaved.
Definition 10. f -verisimilitude of a probabilistic theory.
Given a statistical distance m and an ϵ ∈ R+0 . Now suppose that f is well-







m(P ∗, P ).
As compared to Definition 7, this definition relativizes truthlikeness to two
additional choices: a value for ϵ and a particular function f (for example, a
root function).
In fact, this ongoing relativization points us towards a crucial conceptual
difficulty in quantifying versimilitude: how should one balance broadness of
scope versus amount of truth? In the case of classical logics, this problem is
“solved” by virtue of the naturalness of the Schurz–Weingartner–Cevolani
framework. For probabilistic theories, however, there does not seem to be
an equally natural choice. In particular, it is not clear what the trade-off
between coarseness of the theory and losses incurred should be. This can be
set by selecting a particular function f and, arguably, this is a subjective or
at least context-dependent choice.
Although Definition 10 allows for various choices, it is still not fully gen-
eral, since it only applies to probabilistic theories that specify probabilities
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on a subalgebra of the probability function associated with the true theory.
As such, the possibility of being mistaken about the relevant sample space
and the related matter of conceptual novelty have not been addressed here
— a shortcoming shared with all extant proposals for verisimilitude.
4.4 Approximate truth of probabilistic theories
Some of the ideas in the previous section can also be applied to the notion
of approximate truth of probabilistic theories. As before, we refer to such
theories by their probability functions. Unlike verisimilitude, approximate
truth is not affected by how much or how little a theory addresses, merely
which fraction of the claims that the theory does make is true. In terms of
probability functions, it does not matter how coarse the subalgebra is. The
trivial algebra (empty set and sample space) and the trivial (0, 1)-probability
assignment to it give rise to a maximal approximate truth, represented by a
value of 1. This is the same approximate truth value obtained by a theory
that stipulates a probability P ′ = P ∗.
As long as we are dealing with finite algebras, we can define the approx-
imate truth value as the fraction of correct probability assignments in the
basis of the function’s algebra normalized by the number of elements of that
basis. However, this would again raise the problem that no distinction is
made between near misses and assignments that are far off the mark.
We propose to reuse our solution from Section 4.2: introducing a statis-
tical (pre-)distance between the hypothesized probability function and the
compatible coarsening of the true probability function at the level of the
hypothesized function. This idea is applied in the following definition.
Definition 11. Approximate truth of a probabilistic theory.
Let P ∗ be the true probability function on an algebra A and let P ′ be a
theoretically proposed probability function defined on A′ ⊆ A. Let DA′ be
a finite set of probability functions defined on A′ (contextually defined by
which probabilistic theories are relevant). Given a statistical (pre-)distance
m, the approximate truth of P ′ is:
ATm(P
′) := 1− m(P
∗, P ′)
max{m(P ∗, P ′′) | P ′′ ∈ DA′}
.
4.5 Outlook
In future work, we plan to put the proposals forwarded here to the test:
by applying the proposed definitions to concrete examples, we can check
how various choices of measures and parameters influence the attainment
of various goals, such as convergence to the truth in the limit or speed of
approach to the truth. Such a study will also help us to clarify whether the
proposals in Definitions 10 and 11 are robust in the following sense: different
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(pre-)distances m usually lead to different numerical results, but subsets of
them could still lead to the same ordinal ordering. The methodology for
investigating this hypothesis relies on numerical simulations, similar to the
work of Douven & Wenmackers (2017), and requires a separate study.
Another matter that requires follow-up is more conceptual in nature: al-
though probabilistic theories played a central role in our paper, we have not
touched upon the thorny issue of the interpretation of probabilities. Yet, es-
pecially when we want to analyze the verisimilitude of probabilistic theories,
it is highly relevant what the probabilities are taken to represent: are they
transient features related to a lack of knowledge that may be improved upon,
or are they permanent markers of irreducible stochasticity? This question
can be related to a more general one in the verisimilitude literature about
the goal of science: does science aim at a complete and true description of
the actual world, which can be related to a particular realization of a prob-
abilistic model? Or does it aim at finding true laws that pick out physical
possibilities among all logical possibilities?
As mentioned in Section 4.2, Kuipers (1982) clarified that these view-
points lead to two different notions of verisimilitude, called descriptive verisimil-
itude and theoretical verisimilitude, respectively. In the context of proba-
bilistic theories, this leads to an analogous question that can be phrased as
follows: should “the truth” be represented as a degenerate probability dis-
tribution that assigns all probability mass to single possible outcome, which
is equal to the unique physical realization that unfolds in time, or not? We
have assumed that there is a most fine-grained algebra and a true probabil-
ity function, P ∗, defined on it. As such, our formalism does not presuppose
that the goal of science is merely to describe the actual world, but instead to
describe physical possibilities with their associated probabilities. However,
if someone were to add the assumption that P ∗ is degenerate (in the sense
of being equivalent to a Class I theory), the same formalism may perhaps
be used to make sense of descriptive verisimilitude as well.
Finally, we think these discussions can be enriched by case studies that
go beyond toy problems and that consider applications outside of philosophy
of science proper, for instance in computer science.
5 Conclusions
Taking stock, in this paper we have made some progress in analyzing three
Popperian concepts — riskiness, falsifiability, and truthlikeness — in a for-
mal and unified context, in particular when considering probabilistic theo-
ries. In Section 2, we have disentangled two dimensions of riskiness. The
first one, informativeness, correlates positively with gradable falsifiability
and can be modeled formally. We have also clarified that a formal account
of degrees of falsifiability should capture the interplay between two algebras,
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that of the language of the theory and that of the experimental context. We
have shown that this analysis applies to deterministic and indeterministic
theories, allowing for a unified treatment. In Section 3, we reviewed the
extant proposals for a formal treatment of truthlikeness and approximate
truth. Despite the indisputable virtues of the Schurz–Weingartner–Cevolani
framework, we also found some shortcomings. One issue is that they involve
a lot of bookkeeping that is, as of yet, incapable of capturing the structure of
probabilistic theories. We believe that capturing this structure is essential
for measuring the “likeness” among theories, and for estimating the likeness
to the true theory in particular. After all, a stopped clock tells the time
exactly twice in twenty-four hours, and by letting the hands turn rapidly
(even counterclockwise!) a clock can be made to indicate the right time as
often as one likes. Yet, only a clock with hands that rotate clockwise at
about one or twelve hours per turn can hope to be like a true time teller.
In response to some of these shortcomings, in Section 4, we have given a
general form for plausible definitions of both truthlikeness and approximate
truth.
Let us now reflect on the relation between the three Popperian concepts
in the title. We have seen that an important ingredient of Popperian riski-
ness is informativeness. Informativeness is related to both falsifiability and
truthlikeness, albeit with different caveats. In the case of falsifiability, infor-
mativeness is an important ingredient. This can be seen, for instance, from
Example 6: there exists a lot of potentially corroborating evidence for the
coarse-grained theory TX that disconfirms or falsifies the more informative
theory TC . In the case of truthlikeness, riskiness increases with it provided
that the theory is in fact true. So, whereas falsifiability is unrelated to
truth or falsehood of a theory, truthlikeness does depend on truth. And
whereas truthlikeness is experiment-independent, falsifiability is related to
experimental severity.
Hence, informativeness does not tell the whole story: the severity of avail-
able experiments should be taken into account as well. Clearly, improbability
alone is not going to cut it either: it correlates with informativeness, but also
with low priors due to variation independent of logical strength and with
past disconfirmation. This observation is related to an impossibility result:
Sprenger (2018) has shown that no corroboration measure based on statisti-
cal relevance can simultaneously represent informativeness and the severity
of tests that a theory has passed successfully. Whereas informativeness is
related to improbability of priors (as far as they are correlated to logical
strength), past predictive success leads to increased posterior probability:
these are clearly two dimensions that cannot be meaningfully combined into
one total order.
Of course, actual scientific theories and their historical development are
more complicated than any formal model can hope to capture, but we think
studies like ours should aim for the Russellian goal of “enlarging our abstract
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imagination”. As such, we hope our proposals will encourage further debate
and development of a formal account that further unifies Popperian concepts
and Bayesian or information-theoretic methods.
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Appendix A: Degrees of falsifiability and logical
strength
The point of bold theories is to describe a true state of affairs with sentences
of the language (say L) that are as precise as possible. Any observation, ϕ,
that is inconsistent with a theory falsifies it.
Here we propose a sufficient condition for relative falsifiability: theory
τ1 is more falsifiable than theory τ2 if every observation that falsifies τ2 also
falsifies τ1.
11 So, intuitively, theories become more falsifiable with logical
strength. Indeed, if τ1 is logically stronger than τ2, then we have the class
of models Mod(τ1 ∪ {ϕ}) ⊆ Mod(τ2 ∪ {ϕ}) for every ϕ.
Note that, even though we naturally prefer true theories over false ones,
this does not matter for relative falsifiability: this is exactly as it should
be. Secondly, even though we believe that the above is a sufficient condition
for relative falsifiability, we do not believe it to be a necessary condition.
For example, Popper (1963) argued that the theory of relativity is more
falsifiable than psychoanalysis, even though neither seems to logically entail
the other. Our sufficient condition also plays well with our ideas regarding
prior credences, since probabilities decrease with logical strength.
Appendix B: Relation between severity and entropy
We illustrate that a severity measure corresponds to an entropy measure
by means of an example. In particular, we show that the severity measure
defended by Milne (1995) is related to the Kullback–Leibler divergence.
11For the sake of simplicity, we only consider theories that have models in the first place.
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Milne (1995) has proposed to define the severity of a test as its expected
disconfirmation. First, suppose we have a hypothesis h that we would like
to test with an experiment E := {e1, e2, . . . , eN}. Assume that P (h) ̸= 0
and P (ei) ̸= 0 for all ei ∈ E . Then, Milne (1995) defined a measure of the
degree of confirmation (first proposed by I. J. Good) as follows (with the
base of the logarithm arbitrary but fixed > 1):
cM (h, e) := log
(









P (ei)cM (h, ei). (5)
Milne considered cM (h, e) to be a uniquely well-chosen and natural mea-
sure of confirmation, which combines various aspects of Bayesianism and
vindicates certain Popperian maxims. Nevertheless, Milne realized the su-
periority claim about cM (h, e) as a measure confirmation might not convince
everyone. Indeed, in the later comparison of various measures of confirma-
tion relative to a list of four (a-)symmetry desiderata by Eells & Fitelson
(2002), cM (h, e) did not stand out as the best choice. However, Milne did
maintain that cM (h, e) was at least superior in another regard: as a measure
of the decrease in informativeness and/or uncertainty. This claim stood the
test of time better; see, e.g., Myrvold (2003).
So, can ⟨dE(h)⟩, based on this measure, also be interpreted as a — or
perhaps the — measure of the degree of falsifiability? Unfortunately, the
controversy over cM (h, e) as an adequate measure of confirmation is not
the only issue. Observe that if there exists a possible experiment outcome,
ei ∈ E , that would falsify h (in the classical sense), then P (h | ei) = 0. In
this case, however, the expected degree of confirmation accruing to h with
respect to experiment E is undefined. Hence, the expected disconfirmation
of h, ⟨dE(h)⟩, is undefined as well. For our purposes, it is especially unfortu-
nate that cases of outright falsification remain undefined on this approach.
As long as there is no outright falsification possible, the measure is sensitive
enough to pick out differences among experiments that allow for different
degrees of strong disconfirmation, but it cannot be denied that in scientific
practice the possibility of outright falsification is assumed. Even if we ex-
tend the measure to the extended reals, thus formally allowing to take on
the values ±∞, this measure does not adequately distinguish between com-
binations of theories and experiments that are more likely to result in an
outright falsification. (We discuss a qualitative classification of this kind in
Section 2.4.)
Nevertheless, there is something intuitively compelling about Milne’s
proposal. First, consider a hypothesis, h, and imagine an experiment, E , that
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leaves the posterior upon any outcome, ei, equal to the prior. Since such an
experiment does not provide any confirmation or disconfirmation, it should
be assigned a minimal severity score. We can now consider the severity
of any other experiment of the same hypothesis as an assessment of how
much the posterior can vary across the possible measurement outcomes as
compared to the reference of such a completely insensitive experiment (and
we are grateful to Wayne Myrvold for suggesting this). Milne’s proposal to
use ⟨dE(h)⟩ is of this form, which you can see by substituting the values for an
insensitive experiment (i.e., P (h | ei) = P (h)) into the equation: this yields
⟨dE(h)⟩ = 0, which is indeed the minimal value that this measure can attain.
While this viewpoint does not favour a particular confirmation measure, it
does help to understand why, once an adequate measure of confirmation has
been chosen, positing expected disconfirmation is a sensible way of assigning
severity scores.
It is also interesting to consider the relation between the severity of an
experiment and the boldness of a hypothesis. A first step in the analysis is
to elucidate the severity of a given experiment across two hypotheses and
to relate this notion to relative entropy (in terms of the Kullback–Leibler
divergence). Consider two hypotheses, h1 and h2, relative to an experiment
E , and assume all relevant terms are defined. Now suppose that the expected
degree of confirmation that h1 will accrue relative to E is higher than that
of h2. Or, in terms of disconfirmation:
⟨dE(h1)⟩ ≤ ⟨dE(h2)⟩.






















P (ei) log (P (ei | h1)) ≤ −
∑
i∈{1,...,N}
P (ei) log (P (ei | h2)) .
We can rewrite this in terms of the cross-entropy between two distributions,
H(µ, ν), which is only defined relative to a set of possible outcomes; here
we use E . Effectively, this requires us to restrict the algebra on which the
probability functions are defined to a coarse-grained partition of the sample
space. (We draw attention to this here because the interplay between var-
ious algebras and coarse-graining is a recurrent theme in our paper; see in
particular the end of Section 2.2 and Section 4.) So, assuming we restrict
P , P (· | h1), and P (· | h2) to E , we obtain:
H(PE , PE(· | h1)) ≤ H(PE , PE(· | h2)).
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This can be linked to elementary information theory as follows. Subtract-
ing the Shannon entropy of PE , H(PE), from both sides of the inequality,
we obtain an inequality between relative entropies (given by the Kullback–
Leibler divergence, DKL):
DKL(PE ∥ PE(· | h1)) ≤ DKL(PE ∥ PE(· | h2)).
This means that, relative to the prior PE , PE(· | h1) is more conservative
than PE(· | h2). In other words, h2 is more surprising or bolder than h1.
Initially, we observed that Milne’s preferred measure of confirmation, cM ,
has the drawback of being undefined for hypotheses that allow for outright
falsification. It occurs when the above Kullback–Leibler divergence goes
to infinity, which can indeed be regarded as a sign of bold theories. This
derivation suggests that bolder statements are easier to falsify. Or rather,
they are expected to accrue less confirmation relative to a given experiment
E .
Setting aside experiments that allow outright falsification of a hypothesis
for a moment, it is also interesting to observe that maximally bold hypothe-
ses, as measured by their Kullback–Leibler divergence relative to a prior and
relative to an experiment, are in a sense very precise distributions, maxi-
mally concentrated on a single atomic possibility. This shows that boldness
measured in this way (which is relative to an experiment) nicely aligns with
the first dimension of riskiness: informativeness.
Appendix C: Relation between logical strength and
truthlikeness
Proposition 1. Suppose that τ1 is true and that τ1 |= τ2. Then it holds
that Content(τ1) ≥ Content(τ2).
Proof. Conceptually, we obtain this result by noting that (1) truthlikeness
should increase with logical strength and (2) the content of a true theory is
just its truth content. Let us now do it more formally.
Given that τ1 is true, so is τ2. This means that τ1 |= Et(τ1) and Et(τ1) |=
τ1. Furthermore, Ef (τ1) is empty; likewise for Ef (τ2). This means that
τ1 ≥SW τ2 — for the definition of ≥SW consult Definition 4 of Schurz &
Weingartner (2010). Theorem 1 from Schurz & Weingartner (2010) now
yields that Tr(τ1) ≥ Tr(τ2). But since τ1 and τ2 are true, Tr(τ1) and
Tr(τ2) reduce to Content(τ1) and Content(τ2), respectively. This concludes
the proof.
This works nicely with one of the spearhead results of Cevolani & Schurz
(2017). Verisimilitude contains two parts: likeness (qua truth) and content.
If the likeness is perfect (it only pertains to true theories in the proposition
above), then the only thing that can differ is the content.
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